This paper investigates how input trade liberalization a¤ects …rm-level wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. A fall in input tari¤s generates increased …rm pro…ts, which, in turn, widens wage inequality since skilled labor enjoys a larger proportion of the incremental pro…ts. We analyze this type of channel with an augmented Amiti-Davis(2012) model. Using Chinese …rm-level production data, we …rst estimate and calculate …rm-level wage inequality, which is found to be much greater than that in the U.S. After controlling for possible endogeneity, we …nd evidence consistent with our theoretical prediction that input trade liberalization widens within-…rm wage inequality.
Introduction
The impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor is one of the most important research topics in empirical international trade. Initially, trade economists focused on the nexus between outsourcing and wage inequality. Previous works, such as Feenstra and Hanson (1996 Hanson ( , 1999 and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , investigated the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality. Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2003) argued that, in the presence of vertical integration, outsourcing would increase wage inequality in developed countries like the U.S.
in the same manner as did technological development. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argued that the gains from improved o¤shoring opportunities could be shared by all domestic parties. As such, less costly o¤shoring might not necessarily a¤ect wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. Recently, research interests shifted to an examination of the impact of trade liberalization on wages. Amiti and Davis (2012) analyzed Indonesian …rm-level data and found that output tari¤ reductions lowered wages at import-competing …rms but raised wages at exporting …rms. Meanwhile, input tari¤s fostered wages at import-using …rms relative to those …rms that only used domestic intermediate inputs.
Di¤erent from Amiti and Davis (2012) , this paper focuses on the impact of input trade liberalization on …rm-level wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. This approach is in line with Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) . We analyze Chinese …rm-level data and …nd that input tari¤ reductions widen the within-…rm wage inequality. This is mainly because input tari¤ reductions generate more pro…ts, which, in turn, increase within-…rm wage inequality since skilled labor enjoys a larger proportion of the incremental pro…t, as suggested by the fair-wages literature (e.g. Egger and Kleickemier, 2012) . In this paper, we extend Amiti and Davis (2012) to introduce wage inequality to the model, and we clearly predict a negative relationship between input tari¤s and wage inequality.
This paper contributes to the literature in at least four important ways. First, it provides direct evidence of China's …rm-level wage inequality in the new century. We …rst estimate and compute wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labor, and …nd that the absolute annual wage gap in the sample is RMB 11,320 (equivalently, $1,800). In addition, the relative wage inequality is 2.21-with wages for skilled labor more than twice that for unskilled labor. This …gure is much higher than the one found in the U.S. (approximately 1.7) during the same period of 2000 to 2006 (Feenstra, 2010 ). The …gure is also higher than the one in European countries, largely due to the fact that European countries typically have much stronger labor unions (Kranz, 2006) . Perhaps because of data limitations, previous work on wage inequality only focused on urban industrial-level data (e.g., Khan and Riskin, 1998) or limited survey small sample data (e.g., Xu and Li, 2008) . To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the …rst to use rich and disaggregated full-sample …rm-level data to explore the issue. Our …ndings, therefore, provide micro-level evidence to understand the exaggerated aggregated wage inequality in China.
Second, the paper enriches our understanding of the sources of China's growing wage-and, it follows, income inequality, as wage inequality is an important component of income inequality. 1 Ongoing trade liberalization and rising wage inequality simultaneously occur in many developing countries such as Argentina (Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003) , Chile (Beyer et al., 1999) and other Latin American countries (Atolia, 2007) . As the second largest economy and the largest exporter in the world, China is also one of the countries with greatest income inequality. China's Gini coe¢ cient in 2012 was 0.49, which is much higher than the …gure in the U.S. (approximately 0.30). It is a concern that this growing income inequality might challenge both China's sustainable growth and the world's economic growth in the near future as China has become the locomotive of world economic growth since the recent global …nancial crisis (Lin, 2012) .
Third, our paper contributes to an understanding of the endogenous nexus between trade liberalization and wage inequality from two perspectives. On the one hand, we explore the nexus by taking …rm heterogeneity into account. Most previous works relied on the new-classical HeckscherOhlin model to test whether or not trade liberalization bene…ts the abundant factor and, therefore, a¤ects income distribution between skilled and unskilled labor. If the Stopler-Samuelson theorem is supported by data, trade liberalization on imported capital-intensive goods would mitigate wage inequality in the developing countries. 2 Di¤erent from the predictions of the conventional trade theory, most empirical work …nds that globalization leads to larger wage inequality (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) . These works usually rely on industry-level wage data or proxy wage inequality using the Gini coe¢ cient, a standard indicator of income inequality (e.g., Beyer et al., 1999) . The absence of …rm and worker heterogeneity in these works also makes wage inequality within …rms a type of "black-box." Our paper tries to …ll this gap. 3 On the other hand, previous works usually concentrated on trade liberalization on …nal goods. For example, Han et al. (2012) …nds that China's accession to the World Trade Organization since 2001 was strongly associated with widening wage inequality in China. Autor et al. (2013) stresses that China's exports to the American market signi…cantly contribute to the aggregate decline in the U.S. manufacturing employment and cause the sharp increase in U.S. social bene…t claims. However, imported intermediate inputs are found to be crucial to boosting …rm productivity for many countries, such as the U.S. (Hanson et al., 2005) , Indonesia (Amiti and Konings, 2007) , India (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) and China (Yu, 2011) , which could also, in turn, a¤ect wage inequality. In this paper we turn our focus to the impact of input trade liberalization on wage inequality.
Finally, our paper makes a methodological contribution to the literature by estimating and calculating the measured wage inequality. Similar to other previous works, due to the data limitations, 2 Previous works have also a debated on the validity of factor price equalization (FPE) in explaining wage inequality in developed countries. For example, Johnson and Sta¤ord (1993) and Leamer (1993 Leamer ( , 1996 argue that FPE can explain the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. However, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) reviewed historical data on the prices of labor-intensive and capital-intensive goods and found that the movement of the relative prices of these two types of goods may suggest wage equality according to FPE. 3 An outstanding exception is that of Akerman et al. (2013) , which …nds that trade liberalization not only enhances the dispersion of revenues across heterogenous …rms but also widens wage inequality across workers and …rms. We are also in line with Groizard et al. (2012) , which explores the endogenous nexus between trade liberalization and job ‡ow in California.
we are not able to analyze …rm-level wage inequality. However, we have information on …rm-level average wages and the proportion of skilled labor share. With these data, we are able to introduce a variety of approaches to estimate and calculate …rm-level wage inequality (both in absolute and relative terms) by borrowing the idea of "fair wages," a standard and widely accepted theory in labor economics. We …nd that our estimates of input trade liberalization on wage inequality are insensitive by using our di¤erent measures of …rm-level wage inequality.
In this paper, we …rst develop a model that distinguishes import tari¤ reductions between intermediate inputs and …nal goods and we derive the impact of input tari¤ reductions on wage inequality in a set-up with heterogeneous …rms à la Amiti and Davis (2012) . We argue that input tari¤ reductions would lower a …rm's costs and thus increase its pro…tability. As introduced in the fair-wage literature (e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012), wages for both skilled and unskilled labor depend on a …rm's pro…tability. Since skilled workers usually have more bargaining power than do the unskilled, the former would have a greater share of the pro…t margin. As a result, input tari¤ reductions increases a …rm's pro…tability and widens its wage inequality. Compared with Amiti and Davis (2012), a novel element in our model is that we consider worker heterogeneity. As well, we focus on the impact of input tari¤ reductions on wage inequality after controlling for factors like output tari¤ reductions.
We test our augmented Amiti and Davis (2011) model using a rich Chinese …rm-level data set for the period 2000 to 2006. Our …rst step is to estimate and calculate …rm-level wage inequality in three di¤erent ways. We …rst obtain the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor using a …rm's total pro…t as a proxy for its pro…tability. Since a …rm's total pro…t is volatile with its size, we then adopt a …rm's pro…t-sales ratio as an alternative proxy to estimate a …rm's wage inequality. Di¤erent from the related literature on measures of wage inequality, we take an additional step to denote wage inequality as the ratio between skilled and unskilled wages. Since all such measured wage inequality is estimated as opposed to observed, it may be a concern that some observations are estimated more precisely than others. We, therefore, compute the standard deviation of a …rm's relative wages across …rms within an industry and multiply a …rm's relative wages as a new measure of a …rm's wage inequality. 4 After controlling for possible endogeneity issues from reverse causality or omitted variables, we …nd that input trade liberalization widens wage inequality within …rms. Such …ndings are robust to di¤erent measures of wage inequality, as well as di¤erent empirical speci…cations and data spans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model to show that input trade liberalization increases wage inequality. Section 3 describes the data and measures the key variables used in the estimates. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and, …nally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
The Model
In order to investigate the e¤ect of trade liberalization on wage inequality, instead of focusing on homogeneous labor, we extend the (n + 1)-country model in Amiti and Davis (2011) by introducing both skilled and unskilled workers into the …nal goods production.
Consumption (of …nal goods)
A representative consumer allocates her expenditure E across a continuum of available …nal-goods
where p(q) denotes price and quantity for variety v, respectively. > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between …nal-goods varieties. The demand curve for the …nal product v is q(v) = Q[p(v)=P ] and the corresponding revenue is r(v) = R[p(v)=P ] 1 , where Q = U and P is an aggregate price index
with P Q = R: 4 Feenstra et al. (2013) also use this approach to handle trade uncertainty regarding Chinese …rms'exports.
Production of …nal goods (and intermediate inputs)
Each country has a sector of intermediate inputs that are available in a …xed measure of varieties on a unit interval, m f (j) 2 [0; 1]. 5 These inputs are produced under constant return-to-scales, with one unit of unskilled labor producing one unit of the intermediate input. Therefore, under free entry, the local price of the domestic intermediate inputs is also equal to the unskilled wage w.
To produce …nal goods, each potential entrant/…rm has to incur a sunk cost f e to obtain a random
The respective elements are the …rm's production technology (productivity v ), the required share of skilled labor in production v , and the idiosyncratic components of marginal trade costs in imports t M v and exports t Xv : That is, for a given technology v , we assume that production requires each …rm to employ a particular share of the skilled labor (presumably v and v are positively correlated).
After learning their characteristics, some …rms exit without producing, and the remaining mass of …rms M will choose labor (both skilled and unskilled) and intermediate inputs to produce …nal outputs destined for each market to maximize pro…ts. Steady state requires that new entries matches …rm exits (at a constant hazard death rate). 
where v is the …rm-speci…c technology/productivity parameter and f is the …xed cost of production.
We assume thereafter that all …xed costs are in units of domestic intermediates. 6 The composite labor input L is given by,
where l s and l u are skilled and unskilled labor inputs, and v is the share of the skilled workers employed. Therefore,
is the …rm-speci…c skilled-unskilled labor ratio.
Unlike unskilled labor, skilled labor receives a wage, w v , that is related to the performance of the …rm for which they work. Following the fair-wage argument in Amiti and Davis (2011), we assume
is a function of a …rm's pro…t because, unlike unskilled workers, skilled workers have some bargaining power in production. Speci…cally, we assume that w(0) = w; 0 < w 0 ( v ) < 1;
w w( v ) w: Therefore, the wage for the composite labor in (3) becomes,
where w v = w( v ) w is the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor. Furthermore, since W 0 v = v w 0 , the relationship between W v and v in (4) is illustrated in Figure 1 .
For simplicity, we assume that unskilled labor has little bargaining power and therefore their wage is unrelated to a …rm's pro…t. Without loss of generality, we normalize the unskilled wage to unity.
Thus, the local price of the domestic intermediate inputs of each country is also equal to unity and the price index of the composite intermediate inputs becomes,
where Parameter > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of intermediates.
Therefore, the marginal cost corresponding to (2) is
where k (1 ) (1 ) : Because of the mark-up pricing rule, the domestic price of a …nal-goods variety is p vd = c v = . Thus, revenue in the domestic market becomes
The total revenue is
(1 )(1 ) 1 (8) where Xv = X t Xv > 1 is …rm v's idiosyncratic iceberg export cost to serve a foreign market, which consists of a common component X > 1 and a …rm-speci…c component t Xv 1. Notice that (8) re ‡ects the fact that, in addition to the domestic market, exporting gives a …rm access to n additional foreign markets, each of which is 1 Xv < 1 times the size of the former.
Therefore, the pro…t for a …rm with both exported …nal goods and imported intermediates is
where f is the …xed cost of production, f X is the …xed cost of exporting to a foreign market, and f M is the …xed cost of importing from a foreign country. When a …rm only exports …nal goods, its pro…t becomes
When a …rm only imports intermediates, it pro…t becomes
When a …rm only serves the domestic market, its pro…t is
Firms whose pro…ts are negative exist the market completely.
For given macro variables (i.e., R and P ), Eq. (4), together with any of Eq. (9)- (12), can determine a …rm's pro…t and wages for the composite labor (and, therefore, the wage gap or the skilled wage using Eq. (4)). Among these four modes, each …rm chooses the one that maximizes its pro…t. Thus, …rm wages, pro…ts and all other variables are determined conditional on the macro variables.
Following Amiti and Davis (2011), since most …rms neither export nor import, we assume that
The …rst assumption ensures that zeropro…t …rms do not export and the second that a …rm earning zero pro…t when it fails to import intermediates will not …nd it advantageous to import intermediates. 7 Together these assumptions imply that there is an equilibrium cut-o¤ such that a …rm survives if and only if : Therefore, the pro…ts of a …rm conditional on the cut-o¤ can be written as v = ( v ; b ), where b is the notional cut-o¤ productivity because zero-pro…t …rms have wages equal to unity (see Eq. (4)):
7 Notice that the net gains from importing intermediates are [(1+n
1]f nfM < 0 means that the maximum gain from importing intermediates is negative.
From Eq.(13), we can obtain the macro values consistent with b :
With Eq. (14), from the previous …rm's optimization problem we can obtain v = ( v ; b ); which is consistent with this notional cut-o¤ and all other equilibrium variables.
Therefore, using Eq. (9) and Eq.(4), it is straightforward to obtain the following proposition.
Proposition A reduction of t M v increases the …rm wage gap w v between skilled and unskilled labor.
This result can be illustrated using Figure 1 . From Eq. (9) On average, the sample accounts for more than 95% of China's total annual output in the manufacturing sectors. 8 The data set covers more than 100 accounting variables and contains all of the information from the main accounting sheets, which includes balance sheets, loss and pro…t sheets and cash ‡ow statements.
Given its rich information, the …rm-level production data set is now widely used in research, It is important to note that some Chinese …rms do not have their own production activity, but rather import goods and then sell them to other domestic companies or export goods collected from other domestic …rms (Ahn et al., 2011) . To ensure the precision of our estimates, we exclude such trading companies from the sample in all estimates. In particular, …rms with names that include any
Chinese characters for Trading Company or Importing and Exporting Company are excluded from the sample since trading companies are required to register with a name that contains these Chinese characters.
Measures
Our theoretical framework suggests that a fall in input trade costs widens wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. We test this theoretical conjecture using Chinese …rm-level production data. In this paper, …rm-level wage inequality is …rst taken as the absolute wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor. Since previous works such as Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999 ) also measure wage inequality in a relative term, we also use a relative wage ratio (i.e., skilled wages divided by unskilled wages) as an alternative index and run additional robustness checks. We consider the following empirical framework:
where w s it and w u it are the wages paid to the skilled and unskilled labor for …rm i at year t, respectively.
IIT is industry-level input tari¤s, which are our key regressors. X it denotes all regressors of interest.
is a combined vector that includes both input tari¤s and other control variables.
Although this empirical speci…cation seems straightforward, it faces an important empirical challenge: a …rm's skilled and unskilled wages are unavailable. The only available data in Chinese …rm production data are a …rm's average wages. Therefore, to investigate the impact of input trade liberalization on a …rm's wage inequality, our empirical speci…cations consist of two steps. The …rst step is to compute the measured …rm-level wages inequality, which is taken as the regressand in the second step's estimates.
Measures of Firm-Level Wage Inequality
By allowing that skilled wages are di¤erent across …rms within an industry, skilled wages (w s ijt )
paid by a …rm i of industry j in year t can be decomposed to two components: industrial average skilled wages (w s jt ) and a …rm-speci…c error term (" s ijt ): w s ijt = w s jt + " s ijt . Analogously, a …rm's unskilled wages are decomposed to industrial average unskilled wages and a …rm-speci…c residual:
Therefore, a …rm's wages inequality can be expressed as
where the …rst equality is by de…nition. In the second equality, the …rst term is industry-level wages inequality (denoted as jt ) whereas the second term is the …rm-level di¤erence in the skilled and unskilled wage residuals. As suggested by our theoretical model, such wage residuals are a function of a …rm's pro…tability. If a …rm is more pro…table, it will allocate more dividends to skilled workers than to unskilled workers, ceteris paribus. Since larger …rms (i.e., with more sales) usually have more pro…ts, we measure a …rm's pro…tability as …rm pro…ts over sales. However, our main estimation results remain robust even if we use a …rm's total pro…t as a proxy for its pro…tability, as discussed later. The within-…rm wages residuals thus can be estimated as " s ijt " u ijt = jt ijt where ijt is a …rm's pro…tability and jt is the estimated coe¢ cient for industry j in year t, which is presumed to be identical across …rms within an industry. 9 Hence, a …rm's wages inequality is given by:
We then estimate the coe¢ cients in Eq. (17) by industry and year by taking advantage of data on average wages and share of skilled labor. Denoting ijt the skilled labor share which is measured by the share of employees with at least some college education, a …rm's average wage can be theoretically expressed as (see Appendix A for details):
With data on a …rm's average wages, skilled labor share and …rm pro…tability, we can estimate the coe¢ cients b jt and b jt . Note that since the term w u jt is varied by industry j and by year t, we estimate Eq. (18) by industry and by year so that w u jt is treated as a constant term in each regression. The measured …rm-level wage inequality can be computed by backing up the coe¢ cients of b jt and b jt :
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the year-average measured …rm-level wage inequality ( \ wgap1 ijt )
by Chinese two-digit industry. The mean of …rm wage inequality, measured by the wages gap between skilled labor and unskilled labor in an absolute term, is RMB 11,320 (or equivalently, $1400), with a relatively large standard deviation as also reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 2A . This large standard deviation is likely due to the inclusions of outlier industries such as tobacco (code: 16. See column (1) of Table 2 ), which has an extremely high measured wage inequality. To ensure that our estimates are not contaminated by such outliers, we drop …rms from the tobacco industry from our estimations.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Measures of Input Tari¤s
Now we turn to measure input tari¤s. Inspired by Amiti-Konings (2007) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we construct the industry-level input tari¤s, IIT jt , as follows:
where IIT jt denotes the industry-level input tari¤s facing …rms in industry j in year t. nt is the tari¤ of input n in year t. The weight in parenthesis is measured as the cost share of input n in the production of industry j.
We use China's Input-Output 10 Third, we make another concordance to link ISIC and the HS 6-digit trade data where we can …nd the corresponding tari¤s from the WITS. Fourth, we calculate the industry-level tari¤s that are aggregated to the CIC sectorial level. 11 In particular, the simple average tari¤s are used to calculate industry-level tari¤s as follows:
where k denotes products (at the HS 8-digit level) in industry n. We use these simple average tari¤s as a default measure in the main estimates that follow. Finally, we calculate the industry-level input tari¤s using Eq. (21) . Analogously, the industry-level output tari¤ for industry n in year t is also directly obtained from Eq. (22) .
To see how the input tari¤ reductions a¤ect a …rm's wages inequality, it is worthwhile to examine the evolution of China's trade liberalization and wage inequality throughout the sample period. Table   2A reports the mean and standard deviation for these key variables. As shown in columns (1)- (4) 1 0 Note that China's government adjusted its CIC in 2003. Therefore we also make similar adjustments in our data. 1 1 We do not report the input weights by industry to save space; these data are available upon request.
of Table 2A , the average industry input tari¤s were cut in half from 16.6% in 2000 to 8.6% in 2006, and their standard deviation also dropped by about two-thirds over the same period. Industrial output tari¤s are relatively higher than input tari¤s. Industrial output tari¤s also clearly exhibit a sharp declining trend during the sample period. In sharp contrast, …rm wage inequality increases over the years in question. As seen in columns (5)- (6) of Table 2A , a …rm's annual wages gap doubles from RMB 6,000 in 2000 to RMB 12,500 in 2006 (or equivalently, from $750 to $1,560). Its standard deviation even exhibits a 6.5 times increase, implying that input trade liberalization and wage inequality widening occur simultaneously during the sample period. Table 2B also provides some basic statistical information for the key variables used in the estimations.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
4 Estimation Results
Baseline Results
After obtaining both measured …rm-level wage inequality and industry-level input tari¤s, we are ready to run the following regressions:
where X includes other control variables such as industry output tari¤s and other …rm characteristics (e.g., type of ownership, size and productivity). The error term in Eq. (23) can be further decomposed to three terms: (1) a …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects $ i to control for time-invariant factors such as a …rm's unobserved managerial ability; (2) year-speci…c …xed e¤ects t to control for …rm-invariant factors such as Chinese RMB appreciation since 2005; and (3) an error term it for other unspeci…ed characteristics.
In practise, however, we encounter another data restriction when performing such an empirical speci…cation. We only have information about skilled and unskilled labor (i. We start our estimations by running a simple regression of industry input tari¤s on …rm wages inequality. By abstracting all control variables away, the …xed-e¤ects estimates in column (1) of Table   3 show that a fall in industry input tari¤s tends to result in more wage inequality. The intuition is straightforward. With input trade liberalization, …rms are able to generate more pro…ts by saving on input costs, which, in turn, widens the wage gap since skilled workers enjoy a larger proportion of the incremental pro…t, as suggested by our theoretical model. One may be curious whether such a cost-saving e¤ect could be weakened by tougher import competition e¤ects due to the inclusion of output tari¤s (Amiti and Konings, 2007) . Meanwhile, other …rm characteristics, such as a …rm's type of ownership, size (measured by log of …rm employment) or productivity (measured by the Olley-Pakes (1996) (TFP), could also a¤ect a …rm's wage gap. We therefore include all such control variables in column (2) and we still see a negative and signi…cant estimate for industry input tari¤s.
In addition, output trade liberalization tends to narrow wages inequality, possibly, due to the tougher import competition and consequent decline in …rm pro…tability (Horn et al. 1995) . Interestingly, the coe¢ cient of …rm productivity (in a form of log TFP) is negative. But this is not a worry since it is insigni…cant. Note that SOEs and foreign indicators (FIEs) are still present in the estimates after controlling for …rm-speci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects. This is merely because some SOEs (FIEs) could switch to non-SOEs (non-FIEs) or vice versus. 12 1 2 Table 2 in the appendix presents the transitional probability for SOEs and FIEs, respectively.
The Role of Processing Trade
As mentioned in Feenstra et al. (2013) and also seen in Table 2B , approximately 4.5% of …rms are pure exporters that sell all of their products abroad. An interesting observation is that most pure exporters are processing …rms that enjoy the special tari¤s treatment (i.e., free duty) for importing (e.g., Yu, 2011; Dai et al., 2012) . The appearance of processing …rms suggests two helpful clues for our identi…cation. First, with the inclusion of processing …rms, our estimates of input trade liberalization on wage inequality may be under-estimated since the appearance of processing …rms, which are already duty-free, would dilute the magnitude of our estimations. Ideally we need to remove from the sample those processing …rms where processing imports equal total imports. However, the NBS …rm-level data set does not have this type of processing variable. Nevertheless, by de…nition, a processing …rm is also a pure exporter (although it is not necessary that a pure exporter be a processing …rm). Therefore, we can re-run the …xed-e¤ects estimates after removing the pure exporters in column (3) of Table 3 . The coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is still negative and signi…cant, with a relatively larger magnitude than its counterpart in column (2) where pure exporters are included.
Second, processing trade also serves as a clean natural experiment for our estimations. Because processing imports are already duty free, the ongoing input tari¤s reduction must have no impact on wage inequality in those processing …rms. We therefore run regressions for processing …rms only. If our theory is supported by the data, industry input tari¤s should not have a statistically signi…cant impact on the processing …rms'wage inequality. 13 Although we do not know which …rms exactly are processing …rms from the NBS …rm data set, the customs trade data set reveals this information. Therefore, we can merge the …rm production data set and customs trade data set to identify processing …rms in the …rm data set. As discussed in previous work like Yu and Tian (2012) and Wang and Yu (2012) , such a matching is challenging and imperfect since the two data sets are lack of common identi…cation numbers. By using a …rm's Chinese name, phone number, and zip code as common variables, we are able to merge approximately 40% of exporters and 53% of total exports in the …rm production data set. Since such an exercise is imperfect, some processing …rms may be mis-classi…ed as non-processing in the augmented …rm data set that includes processing information. Nevertheless, as a placebo test, our estimates with processing …rms only in column (4) of Table 3 still help us to understand the impact of input trade liberalization on wage inequality. Meanwhile, previous works like Yu (2011) also point out that less productive …rms could self-select to engage in processing trade. To incorporate this feature, the variable of …rm productivity is taken as a one-year lag in column (5) . In this sub-sample estimates with only processing …rms, the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is insigni…cant, which is consistent with our expectation that processing imports are already duty-free and, as a result, ongoing input trade liberalization does not have an impact on a …rm's wage inequality.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Endogeneity Issues
Thus far, we treat input trade liberalization exogenous. However, tari¤ formation could be endogenous in the sense that wage inequality could reversely a¤ect tari¤ changes. With widening wage inequality, unskilled workers could blame free-trade policy and form labor unions to lobby the gov- it is less likely to happen in China given that labor unions in China are symbolic organizations. As well, it is these types of political factors are time invariant, then our …xed-e¤ect panel estimates in Table 3 have accounted and controlled for them (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2005) . However, if they are time variant, we need to use the instrument variables (IV)-approach to control for these types of endogeneity issues.
It is always challenging to …nd an ideal instrument for tari¤s. Inspired by Amiti and Konings (2007) , we use the one-year lag of industry input tari¤s as current tari¤s. The economic rationale is that industries with strong trade protection in the previous period are more likely to maintain relatively high tari¤s in the current period. Of course, we perform related statistical tests to check for the validity of such an instrument. Table 4 performs the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates by treating industry input tari¤s as endogenous.
Column (1) of Table 4 , once again, abstracts away all control variables and includes only industry input tari¤s as the regressor. The coe¢ cient of industry input tari¤s is negative and signi…cant. Like its counterpart in column (2) of Table 3 , the 2SLS estimates in column (2) of Table 4 include industry output tari¤s and many other control variables. The estimated coe¢ cient of industry input tari¤s is also close to its counterpart in the OLS estimates in Table 3 . A 10 percentage point fall in industry input tari¤s leads to an approximately 12.1 point increase in a …rm's wage inequality, ceteris paribus.
By dropping pure exporters from the sample, the estimated coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is slightly larger than that in column (2), which, in turn, suggests that the inclusion of pure processing …rms could dilute the impact of input trade liberalization on a …rm's wage inequality. As a placebo test, the 2SLS estimates in column (4) include only processing …rms and we still …nd that the e¤ect on processing …rms is statistically insigni…cant, as anticipated.
Still, one may be worried that, in reality, it may take some times for …rms to respond to tari¤ changes. The one-lag input tari¤s may still be correlated with the residual of 2SLS-level estimates, which may violate the exclusion requirement for an instrument. To address this concern, and inspired by Amiti and Davis (2011), we can use one-lag period of input tari¤s as the instrument in a …rst-di¤erenced equation. 14 The economic rationale is that the lag input tari¤s are less likely to in ‡uence the time di¤erence of input tari¤s (Tre ‡er, 2004). The …rst-di¤erenced 2SLS estimates using one-lag of input tari¤s as the instrument is reported in the last column of Table 4 . All regressors in that column are in the form of …rst di¤erence. Once again, the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is negative and statistically signi…cant, with a magnitude close to its counterpart in the full-sample 2SLS-level estimates of column (3).
The bottom module of Table 4 provides the …rst-stage estimates for all speci…cations. The coe¢ cients of the instruments are highly statistically signi…cant. In addition, several tests were performed to verify the quality of the instruments. First, we use the Kleibergen-Paap LM 2 statistic to check whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. As shown in the upper module of Table 4 , the null hypothesis that the model is under-identi…ed is rejected at the one percent signi…cance level. Second, the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F-statistics provide strong evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis that the …rst stage is weakly identi…ed at a highly signi…cant level. All these tests suggest that our instrument is valid and that the speci…cations are well justi…ed.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Cross-Firms versus Time-Series Variations
Because we do not have a …rm's skilled and unskilled labor data for any year except 2004, we have to multiply a proportion of skilled labor at the province-year level using 2004 as a base year to construct the variable of …rm-year wage inequality. This may generate a concern as to whether or not our results are driven by provincial heterogeneity rather than …rm heterogeneity. 15 To address this concern, we perform two placebo tests, as follows.
The …rst robustness check is to drop samples in all years except 2004. We perform the cross-section OLS estimates with data from 2004 only in column (1) of Table 5 . We also include two-digit industry …xed e¤ects to wash out unspeci…ed industry characteristics. The coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is still negative and signi…cant, indicating that input trade liberalization widens a …rm's wage inequality.
Still, we suspect that the OLS …xed-e¤ects estimates may be biased due to possible endogeneity issues caused by omitted variables or reverse causality. Column (2) of Table 5 performs the 2SLS estimates using one-period lag of input tari¤s as the instrument. It turns out that the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is relatively close to its counterpart for the full-sample 2SLS estimate in column (2) of Table 4 , which con…rms that our full-sample estimates are not driven by the adoption of a relatively aggregated multiplier (i.e. the province-year skilled-labor share).
The second, robustness check is to narrow down the time-series window. Since we only have one-year of data on skilled (and unskilled) labor, one may worry that running regression for a sevenyear period (2000 to 2006) may generate some serial correlations or cause some concern of unit roots that may be prevalent in long-period estimates. To address this, we shut down the long time-series window and only focus on a three-years period (2003 to 2005). We then perform the …xed-e¤ects OLS estimates in column (3) and 2SLS estimates in column (4) of Table 5 . After controlling for the endogeneity, the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s in the 2SLS estimates in column (4) has an identical negative sign and a fairly close magnitude as compared to its counterpart of the full-sample 2SLS estimates in column (2) of Table 4 . Thus, it is safely to conclude that our results are insensitive to the adoption of the province-year skilled-labor share as a remedy to data restrictions.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Robustness Checks using Alternative Measures
As usual, the industry input tari¤s are calculated using a simple-average tari¤s within each Common Industrial Classi…cation (CIC) 2-digit industry level as shown in Eq. (22) . Although taking the simple average across product within an industry seems straightforward, it bears a cost as the import heterogeneity for products within the industry is ignored. For example, suppose a …rm imports 70% of lumber and 30% of steel. Tari¤s on lumber are apparently more important to the …rm than those on steel. However, a simple-average tari¤s cannot take such a di¤erence into account. To address this, we consider the following weighted input tari¤s:
where m kt is the import values for product k within a CIC 2-digit industry n in year t: Once we obtain these weighted input tari¤s, we plug them back into Eq. (21) to obtain the weighted industry input tari¤s (wiit it ). 16 Table 6 reports the estimates using weighted industry input tari¤s. The …xed-e¤ects OLS estimates in column (1) show that the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is still negative and signi…cant after considering the importance of import heterogeneity within an industry. To rule out possible estimation bias due to the inclusion of processing imports, column (2) drops pure exporters from the sample and still yields results similar to those in column (1). Columns (3)-(4) perform the 2SLS estimations to control for the possible endogeneity of the weighted input tari¤s. A one-period lag of industry input tari¤s is still served as the IV with a consequent change. The simple average tari¤s calculated in Eq. (22) is replaced with weighted average tari¤s in Eq. (24) . After controlling for the endogeneity, estimates in columns (3)- (4), once again, suggest that industry input trade liberalization tends to widen …rm-level wage inequality.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Thus far, a …rm's wage inequality is measured in an absolute term as the wage di¤erence between skilled and unskilled labor. It is worthwhile to check whether our estimates are robust when the wage inequality is measured as relative wages between skilled and unskilled labor a là Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) . Table 7 accomplishes this task. The regressand in all estimates except column (5) is the relative wage di¤erence in which a …rm's skilled and unskilled wages are calculated as mentioned previously. As seen in Table 2B , the overall annual relative wages during the sample period is 2.21, which is signi…cantly higher than that in the U.S.(1.75). Column (3) of Table 1 reports the relative wages by industry. The OLS estimates in column (1) of Table 7 and the 2SLS estimates in column (2) of Table 7 cover the seven-year sample (2000 to 2006) and, once again, …nd that input tari¤ 1 6 There is a caveat to this. As pointed out by Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) , such a weighted industry input tari¤ may understate the actual input tari¤ reduction since the imported inputs with lower tari¤s may receive higher import volume and thus have higher weights in Eq. (24) . Therefore, the calculation using weighted tari¤s and the associated estimations in Table 6 should be treated as lower-bound estimates of the e¤ects of input tari¤s on wage inequality. reductions widen a …rm's wage inequality. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient of input tari¤s seems to be too small. We suspect that this is largely because of the spread of the provincial share of skilled labor in such a long time window. Therefore, we run the 2SLS estimates in column (3) Still, the regressand used in all estimations is a measure of wage inequality (in both absolute and relative terms). As the observations are estimated but not observed, it is worthwhile to control for the fact that some observations are estimated more precisely than others. Therefore, we compute the standard deviation of a …rm's relative wages across …rms within an industry and multiply a …rm's relative wages as the regressand in Table 7 (refer to weighted relative wages \ wrwage ijt with a relatively large mean, 2.89, as reported in Table 2B ). The last two columns of Table 1 report the standard deviation and the mean of weighted relative wages by two-level Chinese industry. The coe¢ cient of input tari¤s is negative and signi…cant again; more importantly, its magnitude is quite close to that in column (4). Thus, our estimates remain robust and consistent with our theoretical prediction that input trade liberalization widens …rm-level wage inequality.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
To obtain …rm-level wages inequality, we rely on the argument of fair wages. Firms will allocate more pro…ts to its skilled workers. Since larger …rms usually have more pro…ts, we divide …rm pro…ts by …rm sales to capture pro…tability and use this to estimate …rm-level wage inequality as in Eq. (20) .
It is interesting to ask whether our main …ndings are sensitive to the measure of pro…tability. We then replace a …rm's pro…ts-sales ratio with total pro…ts and re-estimate Eq. (17) to obtain …rm-level wage inequality (refer to \ wgap2 ijt ). By using this alternative wage inequality as the regressand, Table 8 runs …xed-e¤ects regressions with di¤erent speci…cations. Column (1) includes all samples during the period 2000 to 2006, whereas column (2) excludes pure exporters. We see that declining input tari¤s lead to an increase in a …rm's wages inequality. Column (3) takes a further step by replacing the level of a …rm's wage inequality with the …rst-di¤erence in wage inequality; it yields results similar to before. To rule out the possibility that such a result is due to the adoption of provincial skilled share as the multiplier, estimates in column (4) retain data for only 2004, and those in column (5) focus on the shorter period 2003 to 2005. Nevertheless, all speci…cations con…rm that input trade liberalization widens a …rm's wage inequality.
[Insert Table 8 Here]
Our last step is to o¤er a more intuitive economic interpretation for our estimation results. As shown in column (2) of Table 7 , the coe¢ cient of industry input tari¤s is -0.06, implying that a 10
percentage point fall in input tari¤s leads to a 0.6 point increase in relative wage inequality. Average 
Alternative Estimates with Industry Minimum Wages
Thus far, to estimate the e¤ects of input trade liberalization on a …rm's wage inequality, we …rst estimate and calculate the …rm-level wages inequality by taking advantage of information about a …rm's pro…ts. In that way, the industrial minimum wage is abstracted away since it is fully captured by the within-industry wages di¤erential w s jt w u jt = jt . Still, it is worthwhile to explicitly examine the role of minimum wage across industry and over time (Anwar and Sun, 2012) . To do this, we construct a measured industry-level wage inequality.
Consider the following speci…cation for unskilled wages w u ijt = w min jt (1 + s ijt ); where w min jt is the minimum wage of four-digit industry j in year t and s ijt is the premium set by …rm i of four-digit industry j in year t: Inserting such a wage premium equation into Eq. (18) of a …rm's average wages, we have
By allowing …rm-level wage heterogeneity for both skilled (" s ijt ) and unskilled labor (" u ijt ) within each industry, we have
By absorbing all terms with wage residuals ijt " s ijt + (1 ijt )" u ijt into the error term, we can estimate the following equation for each four-digit industry j in di¤erent years t with data on skilled labor share ijt and industry minimum wage w min jt :
where the estimated coe¢ cient^ 1jt denotes industrial skilled wages (w s jt ) and^ 2jt corresponds to the industrial wage premium (1 + s it ) for industry j at year t: Once the measured wage inequality is obtained by backing up the coe¢ cients^ 1jt and^ 2jt , we then obtain the CIC 4-digit industry level wages inequality ( \ wgap3 jt ): Table 1 in the appendix reports the mean of industrial wages inequality at an aggregated CIC two-digit industry level. By way of comparison, the measured …rm-level wage inequality ( \ wgap1 ijt ) is at a more disaggregated level, but it has to rely on the "fair wages" argument. Namely, that …rms will allocate pro…ts disproportionately between skilled and unskilled labor. More precisely, skilled labor can access a larger proportion of a …rm's pro…ts. The measured four-digit industry-level wage inequality ( \ wgap3 jt ) is more ‡exible and needs not depending on such a theoretical hypothesis, although it is not able to capture the wages inequality across …rms within an industry. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to serve as a robustness check for our main question: whether or not input trade liberalization widens wage inequality. Table 9 presents the estimation results using such industry-level wage inequality as the regressand.
Column (1) starts with the OLS estimates. Note that the regressand \ wgap3 jt is measured at the CIC 4-digit level. Thus the number of observations is reduced to 1,750. We include weighted industry input tari¤s (wiit jt ) and industry output tari¤s in all estimates. We also include industry-level average log TFP with one lag to see whether industrial productivity a¤ects the industrial wage gap.
It turns out that the coe¢ cient of industry input tari¤s is negative but insigni…cant. We suspect that this is due to the lack of controlling …xed e¤ects. We therefore run the year-speci…c and industryspeci…c …xed e¤ects in the rest of Table 9 . Estimates in column (2) show that the coe¢ cient of industry input tari¤s turns out to be signi…cant. In columns (3)- (4) we include industry-average log employment to control for industry size and still …nd that input tari¤ reductions widen wage inequality. As shown in column (4), such a …nding is still robust if we exclude pure exporters. Thus, our main …ndings are robust to di¤erent measures of wages inequality and industrial input tari¤s.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we …rst develop a theoretical framework that input trade liberalization leads to higher …rm pro…tability via the channel of fair wage argument, which in turn widens the wages gap between skilled and unskilled labor since the former, in general, has higher bargaining power regarding sharing a …rm's residual pro…t. We then provide rich empirical evidence to test such a theoretical conjecture.
Thanks to the very rich Chinese …rm-level production data set, we are able to construct related measures on wage inequality and input tari¤s. After controlling for endogeneity issues, we …nd that a fall in input trade costs leads to an increase in the wage gap. Input trade liberalization in the new century in China results in an increase in wage inequality in approximately one-quarter of Chinese …rms. (1)- (2) and industry-level input tari¤s that are constructed as described in Eq. (21) in Columns (3)- (4) in the text.
Measured …rm-level wages inequality ( \ wgap1 ijt ) in columns (1) and (2) are carefully described in the text with a unit of RMB 1,000 (or equivalently $125 during the sample period). Notes: RMB 1 is equivalent to $0.125 during the sample period. Information of pure processing …rms are only available after matching …rm production data and customs trade data together. Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the …rm level in parentheses. *** (**,*) denotes the signi…cance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. Columns (1) and (2) includes the entire sample. Column (3) drops pure exporters. Column (4) includes pure processing …rms only. (1)- (4) are levels of …rm's wages inequality ( \ wgap1 ijt ) whereas that in Column (5) is the …rst di¤erence of …rm's wage inequality ( \ wgap1 ijt ). Correspondingly, regressors in Columns (1)- (4) are in levels whereas those in Column (5) are in the …rst di¤erence. IV reports the coe¢ cient of one-lag industry input tari¤s using current industry input tari¤s as the regressand. Columns (1), (2) , and (5) include all sample. Column (3) includes all sample except pure exporters. Column (4) includes pure processing …rms only. Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the …rm level in parentheses. *** (**,*) denotes the signi…cance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. Columns (1) and (3) include the entire sample whereas columns (2) and (4) include the entire sample except pure exporters. In the …rst-stage estimates, IV reports the coe¢ cient of one-lag industry input tari¤s using current industry input tari¤s as the regressand. Notes: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the …rm level in parentheses. *** (**,*) denotes the signi…cance at 1% (5%, 10%) level. Columns (1) and (3) includes the entire sample, whereas column (2) includes the entire sample except pure exporters. Column (4) includes data in 2004 only. Column (5) include data in [2003] [2004] [2005] . Regressands in all columns except column (3) are levels of …rm's wages inequality ( \ wgap2 ijt ), whereas that in Column (3) is the …rst di¤erence of …rm's wage inequality ( \ wgap2 ijt ). Correspondingly, regressors in all columns except column (3) are in levels, whereas those in Column (3) are in the …rst di¤erence. 
Appendix A: The Measured Wage Inequality
In this appendix we describe how we construct …rm-level and industrial wage inequality. We start from the derivation of measured …rm-level wage inequality. Notice that …rm i's average wage in industry j at year t can be expressed as The second equality follows the de…nition of w s ijt = w s jt + " s ijt and w u ijt = w u jt + " u ijt . The third equality is due to within-industry wage di¤erential w s jt w u jt = jt . Rearranging the fourth equality, we can easily obtain the last equality by using the equation of within-…rm wage di¤erential " s ijt " u ijt = jt ijt . Therefore, the …rm-level wage inequality is calculated using the estimated coe¢ cients b jt and b jt \ wgap1 ijt = b jt + b jt ijt :
Alternatively, we can estimate and calculate the industry-level wage inequality ( \ wgap3 jt ) as follows. Consider the following speci…cation for unskilled wage w u ijt = w min jt (1 + s ijt ); where w min ijt is the minimum wage and s ijt is the premium set by …rm i of four-digit industry j at year t: Inserting this equation of wage premium to Eq. (29) of …rm i's average wage, we have:
By allowing …rm-level wage heterogeneity for both skilled (" s ijt ) and unskilled labor (" u ijt ) within each industry, we have w ijt = ijt (w s jt + " 
Therefore, we can estimate the following equation for each four-digit industry j in di¤erent years t
where the estimated coe¢ cient^ 1jt denotes industrial skilled wage and^ 2jt is corresponding to the industrial wage premium (1 + s it ) for industry j at year t: Notice that 
After Eq. (32) where the error term in Eq. (23) can be decomposed into three terms as in Eq. (11): (i) a industryspeci…c …xed e¤ect $ i to control for time-invariant factors such as a …rm's managerial ability; (ii) a year-speci…c …xed e¤ect t to control for …rm-invariant factors such as Chinese RMB appreciation; and (iii) an error term it for other unspeci…ed factors.
Appendix Notes: Unit is RMB 1,000 (equivalent to $125 during the period 2000-2007). We do not report standard errors for each coe¢ cient to save space though available upon request. The wage gap is computed by the di¤erence between estimated industry-level skilled wages (^ 1jt ) and unskilled wages which is the product of^ 2jt and industry-year minimum wages w min jt by industry and by year. 
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